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Abstract 
 
As a result of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s (NATO) engagement with United 
Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 and the Women, Peace and Security agenda 
military personnel have been tasked with engaging with and implementing NATO’s 
interpretation of the Women, Peace and Security agenda, to do ‘gender work’ within the 
alliance. There are only a small - though increasing - number of men working full time on 
gender issues within the military structures of the Alliance. This article analyses the 
experiences of two military men actively and consciously ‘doing’ this gender work. Using 
Duncanson’s (2015) notion of a (re)negotiation of gender relationships based upon empathy, 
similarity, interdependence, respect and equality, the accounts of these men are analysed, 
exploring ways in which a more ‘gender conscious’ militarised masculinity may develop. It is 
argued that positive, incremental shifts within militarised masculinities should not be 
dismissed; yet the process is contested, contradictory and incomplete. The article highlights 
how perceived gender transgressions are policed and controlled via trivialisation and 
feminisation and how conceptualisations of masculinist protection (Young 2003) and 
credibility, can reinforce pre-existing gender relations, rather than challenge or change them.  
 
Keywords: Gender, Militarised Masculinities, Masculinist Protection, NATO, Women, 
Peace and Security 
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Introduction  
 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s (NATO) engagement with United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 1325 (UNSCR 1325) on Women, Peace and Security (UN 2000) is a 
relatively recent occurrence; beginning in earnest in 2007 with a joint policy on 
implementing UNSCR 1325 with the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), a 
multilateral forum for dialogue and consultation on political and security-related issues 
among the twenty-eight NATO allies and partner countries (EAPC 2007). In 2009, NATO 
formally adopted Bi-Strategic Command Directive 40-1 (Bi-SCD 40-1) which set out 
NATO’s desire to ‘integrate UNSCR 1325 and a gender perspective into the NATO 
command structure’ (NATO 2009). Despite being a relative latecomer to the Women, Peace 
and Security agenda – UNSCR 1325 was adopted in 2000 - NATO has, over recent years, 
engaged in a sustained and increasingly complex engagement with gender issues (See Wright 
2016). National Action Plans (NAPs) to implement UNSCR 1325 have been developed – to 
varying degrees of consistency and success – within member states; NATO Allied Command 
Operations (ACO) and Allied Command Transformations (ACT) have produced doctrine, 
directives and reports as well as training and education material respectively (see Schjølset 
2013, 575; NATO 2015). In addition, the Committee for Women in NATO Forces (CWINF), 
established in 1976, was renamed the NATO Committee for Gender Perspectives (NCGP), 
Gender Advisors and Gender Field Advisors have been recruited across the alliance and in 
2012 the Secretary General appointed a Special Representative for Women, Peace and 
Security (NATO 2012a).  
 
As a result of NATO’s engagement with the Women, Peace and Security agenda numerous 
individuals have been tasked with engaging with and implementing NATO’s interpretation of 
the agenda; to do ‘gender work’ within the alliance. There are only a small - though 
increasing - number of men working full time on gender issues within the military structures 
of the Alliance. This article analyses the ways in which NATO’s engagement with the 
Women, Peace and Security agenda influences perceptions and constructions of military 
masculinities within NATO through focusing on the experiences of two military men actively 
and consciously ‘doing’ this gender work, tracing out how a more ‘gender conscious’ 
militarised masculinity may develop.  
 
The various constructions of masculinities within militaries and their relation to power, 
violence and warfare has garnered much critical attention in feminist research (Enloe 1983, 
2000, 2007; Connell in Kimmel & Messner 1989; Morgan 1994; Parpart and Zalewski 2008; 
Higate 2003a, 2007; Whitworth 2004; Duncanson 2009, 2013; Kirkby & Henry 2012). 
Raewyn Connell’s (1995, 2005a) conceptualisation of a hierarchical gender order in which 
multiple masculinities (and an emphasised femininity) are ordered in relation to a hegemonic 
masculinity has been used extensively in studies and theorisations of the construction of 
militarised masculinity. As Parpart and Partridge (2014) note: ‘Militarised masculinity has 
been theorised as a specific form of masculinity that is described as hegemonic because it is 
focused on creating a widely accepted dominance over other people, especially women, 
children and subordinate males, within a patriarchal gender order and is associated with 
activities that are seen as largely male such as combat and rape’ (2014, 550 – citing Basham 
2013; Belkin 2012; Higate 2007). Many have theorised that the construction of hegemonic 
militarised masculinity results from the painstaking efforts expended by militaries to 
construct uniformity through social practice (Kovitz 2003), a process that seeks to expel non-
conforming men and to exorcise the ‘feminine other’ (Whitworth 2008, 121) from those that 
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remain. Beginning in basic training, this process seeks to create what Cynthia Enloe (2000) 
deemed a particular ‘ideology of manliness’ or a ‘warrior ideal’ that privileges amongst other 
things, heterosexuality, toughness, aggression, action, competiveness, ‘and an ability to 
dehumanise the enemy and defeat them in combat’ (Duncanson 2015, 234). However, 
hegemonic masculinity is not simply a matter of the numerical superiority of a particular 
‘type’ of man (Connell 2005a; Demetriou 2001); it acts as a cultural ideal rather than an 
accurate representation of all soldiers; yet it is dominant in that all negotiate their masculinity 
in relation to it (Duncanson 2015, 234). Feminist research has also identified multiple forms 
and practices of military masculinities (for example, Higate 2003b; Higate and Henry 2004; 
Duncanson 2009, 2013; Conway 2012; Parpart and Partridge 2014). As Claire Duncanson 
notes in the case of armies, the concept of hegemonic masculinity ‘has helped us theorise the 
way in which there are multiple and contradictory masculinities – officers and squaddies, 
combat soldiers and administrative clerks, experienced war-weary generals and gung-ho new 
recruits’ (2015, 234). In short, the constructions of military masculinities within the armed 
forces are nuanced, multiple and are negotiated.  
 
This article draws on data collected from two interviews conducted with serving NATO 
military men, Ben and Mike,1 to identify how military masculinities are (re)negotiated within 
NATO as it engages with the Women, Peace and Security agenda.  Both names have been 
changed and I provide only limited biographical and occupational information for both 
interviewees in order to provide anonymity2. Work on UNSCR 1325 and gender issues more 
broadly within NATO is predominantly, though not exclusively, done by women. The 
executive committee of the NCGP is made up of female officers, indeed it is the only 
committee within NATO to be chaired by a woman. Many of the gender advisors and gender 
focal points are women, though again, not exclusively so. In this respect Ben and Mike 
occupy distinct positions within NATO; they are men, working in predominantly female 
occupied job roles, in an organisation that is still dominated by men (NATO 2012b). This 
article analyses some of the personal and professional views and experiences of Ben and 
Mike. These men are not considered to be representatives of the wider views of men within 
NATO, indeed it was not the intention of the research to produce such generalisable data; 
these are their individual perspectives on what is complex, and at the time the interviews 
were conducted, relatively novel work within the alliance. However, there were striking 
similarities, as well as marked differences, across the interview data from Ben and Mike as 
well as the women interviewed (Hurley 2014). Ben and Mike’s experiences and views – 
contextualised in some instances by accounts from the military women interviewed - offer 
unique insights into the gendered power dimensions of conducting this ‘gender work’ at 
NATO. In this sense, the findings from this article are viewed as a starting point for wider 
research on the impact of the Women, Peace and Security agenda upon understandings and 
constructions of military masculinities at NATO and within armed forces more generally.  
 
Specifically, the aims of this article are two-fold: Firstly, Duncanson’s (2015) argument for a 
less pessimistic account of contemporary military masculinities and her theorisation for 
change in hegemonic masculinity are utilised to argue that actively engaging with ‘gender 
work’ can offer opportunities for a (re)negotiation of military masculinities based around 
respect, empathy, interdependence, similarity and equality (Duncanson 2015, 233). Secondly, 
the article highlights how this process is complicated, contradictory and incomplete; 
highlighting how perceived gender transgressions are policed and controlled via trivialisation 
and feminisation and how conceptualisations of masculinist protection (Young 2003) and 
credibility, can reinforce pre-existing gender relations, rather than challenge them.  
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The article is set out as follows: I begin with a discussion of militarised masculinities and 
Connell’s (1995, 2005a) concept of hegemonic masculinity. This is followed by outlining 
Duncanson’s (2015) argument for a less pessimistic account of change in militarised 
masculinities and how hegemonic masculinity may be undone through two particular stages. 
Here Duncanson’s focus on encouraging men (indeed all subjects) to (re)negotiate their 
identities in relation to others away from opposition and dominance towards a recognition of 
similarity, respect, interdependence, empathy and equality (2015, 233). Following from this 
discussion of the literature, the accounts of Ben and Mike are detailed. Firstly in relation to 
expressions of respect, empathy and interdependence and secondly, the contestations and 
contradictions contained within some of their accounts. Here a particular focus is placed upon 
a feminisation (via trivialisation) and the use of narratives of masculinist protection (Young 
2003) and credibility to both ‘shore-up’ individual positions and produce a palatable rationale 
for men doing ‘gender work’ more generally. The article concludes by arguing that small 
changes within militarised masculinities, in adopting a more gender conscious approach, at 
NATO should not be dismissed simply as the ‘flexibility of the machinery of rule’ 
(Duncanson 2015, 232) but that they – and the contradictions and confusions they produce - 
may offer an indication for how more progressive and sustained change may be achieved.  
 
Making and (Re)making Militarised Masculinities  
 
Military masculinities have been theorised extensively within feminist research (for example, 
Enloe 2007, 2000; Cohn 2000; Goldstein 2003; Parpart and Partridge 2014; Duncanson 2009, 
2013, 2015; Kronsell 2005, 2006, 2012; Via 2010; Conway 2012; Higate 2003a, 2007; 
Higate and Henry 2004; Whitworth 2004, 2005). As Parpart and Partridge (2014, 555) note: 
‘the military has long been seen as a quintessential site for the production of masculinities 
and a source of many of the practices and assumptions associated with hegemonic 
masculinities’. Sylvester (2013) attributes this continued emphasis on the relationship 
between masculinity and warfare to ‘part of a lingering sense that men are either hardwired 
for war or, as is more likely the case socialised to it’ declaring that ‘feminist analysts have 
shown considerable interest in understanding celebrations of warrior men and masculinity’ 
(2013, 39). This work identified a particular construction of masculinity, conceptualised as a 
‘warrior-ideal’ or ‘warrior-ethic’ (Cohn & Enloe 2003); one based around notions of 
violence, aggression, heterosexuality and individual conformity to military discipline 
(Whitworth 2004, 16). Indeed Whitworth (2005, 125) argued that these constructions of 
idealised military masculinity create conformity and uniformity within the organisation writ 
large and simplifying complex, fluid and uncertain understandings of ‘male identity’ within 
recruits. In doing so - she argues - the military replaces these uncertain understandings with a 
‘hegemonic representation of idealized norms of masculinity which privilege the tough, stoic 
emotionless warrior, capable and willing to employ violence’ (Ibid).  
 
Central in many accounts of military masculinity is Raewyn Connell’s (1995; 2005a) concept 
of hegemonic masculinity. Connell conceives of a hierarchical gender order in which 
multiple subordinated masculinities and an emphasised femininity are ordered in relation to a 
hegemonic masculinity. For Connell, hegemonic masculinity is a dominant ‘pattern of 
practice’ (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005) which serves as an ideal – much like in 
Whitworth’s account - rather than a reflecting the practices of most men. Yet, this ‘combat-
orientated masculinity’ is powerful and has material – often destructive effects - in that all 
soldiers negotiate their masculinity in relation to it (Duncanson 2015, 234-5; Parpart and 
Partridge 2014, 550). Connell herself recognises that the military has a central role in the 
production of forms of hegemonic masculinities (1995, 213). As Parpart and Partridge (2014, 
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554) argue, ‘huge quantities of money, resources and time are spent on developing military 
structures that require very specific constructions of gender roles – masculinities and 
femininities – in order to function. These gender hierarchies legitimate the very creation of 
hegemonic masculinity and the consequent gendered access to or exclusion from positions of 
power, wealth and privilege’. Hinojosa (2010) identifies that hegemonic masculinity in the 
military manifests in both ‘external’ and ‘internal’ ways. External in the sense that: 
‘masculine power is embedded in the structure of the institution’ (2010, 180). Examples of 
this can include the banning of women from particular combat roles and the military rank 
system – which ‘ensures that some men maintain dominance over other men and women’ 
(180-181). Hinjosa conceives of an ‘internal hegemony’ as ‘the hierarchical structuring of 
masculinities such that some constructs [of masculinity] are dominant and privileged over 
other masculinities and femininities’ (181). Hegemonic masculinities within a military 
context are therefore both structural and a configuration of everyday gendered social practice 
(Connell 2005a) whereby individuals construct gender identities in relation and opposition to 
other men and women (Hinojosa 2010, 181).  
 
With its increased use the concept of hegemonic masculinity drew critique: that it can imply 
rigidity or representation of masculinity as a simplistic negative type or a toxic assemblage of 
traits; that it oversimplifies complex relationships between men – within the categories of 
hegemonic, subordinate, marginalised – and that it significantly neglected the role of women 
and femininity (Connell & Messerschmidt 2005, 840; Schippers 2007). Connell & 
Messerschmidt, in revising the concept in 2005, addressed some of these critiques and re-
emphasised the importance placed on social context (2005, 832-833) asserting that just as 
‘masculinity and femininity is not a fixed entity in the body or personality traits of 
individuals – masculinities are configurations of practice that are accomplished in social 
action and therefore can differ according to the gender relations in a particular social setting’ 
(836). In critiquing Connell’s formulation of hegemonic masculinity, Schippers (2007, 55) 
work looks to centralise and reclaim the feminine other in theorisations of the gender order. 
Importantly, Schippers also centralises heterosexuality as a key factor in binding masculinity 
and femininity into a binary of submission and domination. Feminist research – within the 
field of critical masculinity studies, as well as feminist International Relations and Security 
Studies – therefore began to pay attention to multiple forms and practices of military 
masculinities (Higate 2003a; Higate and Henry 2004; Duncanson 2009, 2013; Conway 2012; 
Parpart and Partridge 2014). There has been a significant move away from viewing the armed 
forces as typified by one, static type of military masculinity outlined above – some such as 
Paul Higate (2007) have argued that a continued focus on dominant forms of masculinity 
ignores others forms of masculinity experienced by soldiers (Parpart and Partridge 2014, 
551). Writing in 2003, Maria Kovitz (2003, 2) argued that ‘military men are treated as an 
internally undifferentiated group rather than as a socially constructed category incorporating 
disparate individuals exhibiting a spectrum of physical, psychosocial characteristics, interests 
and inclinations’. Plural and nuanced forms of militarised masculinities have subsequently 
been explored (Duncanson 2009, 2013; Niva 1998; Khalili 2011) and military masculinities 
have been seen to be patterned on a civilian/military divide, through the variation of 
occupational roles and across the various branches of the armed forces (See also Barrett 
1996; Higate 2003b).  Research such as that by Belkin (2012) and Cockburn (2010) offer 
nuanced and intersectional understandings of the constructions of militarism, military 
masculinities and femininities. For example, Belkin argues that rather than a simple expulsion 
of the feminine and/or homosexual other, military masculinity is structured by contradiction, 
engaging with both femininity and queerness, not just rejecting or exorcizing them (in 
Bulmer 2013, 135). Parpart and Partridge (2014, 551) explore the multiple masculinities 
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emerging from military institutions and experiences to offer ‘a more complicated and 
complicating discussion of specific experiences of idealised masculinities within the 
militaries…as well as the possibility that multiple understandings of masculinities as well as 
femininities and other constructions of gender may enable more equitable gender practices 
within the military both during conflicts and in times of ‘peace’’. 
 
Military masculinities are therefore multiple, complex and contested, and importantly when 
considering the accounts of Ben and Mike below, can change. Indeed as Parpart and Partridge 
(2014, 561) acknowledge:  
 
‘Contrary to the belief that militarised masculinities are fixed as well as socially 
resilient, they are unstable and often adapted to a variety of circumstances’ and that: 
‘even though militarised masculinities may occupy ‘hegemonic space’ (Connell 
2005a) within the broader field of gender relations they also have many different 
forms – some dominant and some subordinate – and may allow for alternative, non-
hegemonic forms of masculinity within military structures (Higate and Henry 2004)’ 
(Parpart and Partridge 2014, 550).  
 
This final point is important when considering the development of a type of ‘gender 
conscious’ masculinity in the accounts that follow; the following section discusses the 
concept of positive change within hegemonic masculinity and how that might be conceived 
of and achieved.   
 
Theorising Change in Hegemonic (Militarised) Masculinity  
 
Claire Duncanson (2015, 232) has argued that accounts of changes in military masculinities 
are viewed by many feminists as merely the ‘flexibility of the machinery of rule’. That 
military masculinities such as Niva’s (1998) notion of a ‘tough but tender’ military 
masculinity evidenced in the First Gulf War, or Khalili’s (2011) conceptualisation of the 
‘humanitarian soldier-scholars’ of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, are merely hybridisations 
and redefinitions of what is deemed ‘legitimate masculinity’ by those already in positions of 
power; often involving delegitimising and ‘othering’ non-western civilian men and women, 
rather than offering fundamental change (Duncanson 2015, 236-239; see also Razack, 2004 
and Whitworth, 2004). Duncanson also draws attention to changes in gender relations within 
the armed forces, particularly with the inclusion of women in combat roles and referring to 
Bulmer’s (2013) work, the changing attitudes towards sexuality, with the repeal of ‘Don’t 
Ask, Don’t Tell’ in the United States and the ending of compulsory discharge for openly 
homosexual personnel in the UK military (Duncanson 2015, 238). She notes that: ‘One could 
conclude that heterosexuality is no longer so obviously the quintessential practice of 
hegemonic masculinity, and homosexuality the subordinated, as was once the case’ (239). 
However, this does not necessarily represent an uncomplicated acceptance of LGBT 
personnel or that diversification within the armed forces is straightforward. Bulmer (2013) 
highlights how acceptance for some LGBT personnel often comes at the expense and 
exclusion of ‘non-homonormative’ others; whereby ‘old hierarchies are replaced by new 
ones’ (Duncanson 2015, 239).  
 
Whilst accepting these critiques, Duncanson identifies a risk in simply viewing changes in 
hegemonic masculinity as simply a reconfiguration of traits ‘most strategically useful for the 
getting and keeping of power’ (Hooper 2001, 61). The risk, Duncanson argues, ‘is that we 
come to our analysis of gender relations with a framework within which progressive change 
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cannot be conceptualised’, that ‘any shift in gender relations is inevitably hegemony at work 
and there is little point in asking whether such shifts might be signs of progressive change, 
and, more importantly how they could be furthered’ (2015, 240). Indeed, Duncanson argues 
that Connell’s and Messerschmitt’s (2005: 853) conceptualisation of hegemonic masculinity 
does not share this pessimism, arguing that hegemonic masculinity can be dismantled and 
that gender relations can be made more equal (Ibid). The question for Duncanson is how this 
might come about. 
 
Connell and Messerschmitt (2005) propose a two stage process: ‘a “transitional stage” in 
which a version of masculinity is established which is open to equality with women as 
hegemonic among men, then, secondly eradicating relations of hierarchy, presumably 
through allowing the hegemonic masculinity to construct those relations of equality’ 
(Duncanson 2015, 241). Duncanson finds this problematic, arguing that as hegemonic 
masculinity achieves its hegemonic status through the feminisation of other groups of men, it 
is hard to see how a masculinity open to equality with women could ever be hegemonic 
(Ibid). Instead, Duncanson proposes that ‘the ‘transitionary stage’ is more likely to be one 
where hegemonic masculinity shifts to adopt traits, practices and values which are 
conventionally associated with femininity’ (Ibid). Duncanson recognises that this may seem 
like the hybridisations (tough-tender, soldier-scholar) identified above, however she argues 
against confusing the problems in these case-studies with a problem with the concept itself 
(Ibid). Using the example of changing masculinities in the British Army, she argues that:  
 
‘For the unravelling of hegemonic masculinity, men must be encouraged not so much 
to change their ways as to change the way in which they negotiate their identities in 
relation to others. Rather than forge their identities through relations of opposition or 
domination, men and subjects in general need to construct their identities through 
recognition of similarity, respect, interdependence, empathy and equality with others’ 
(Duncanson 2015, 233) – emphasis in original. 
 
Here then, I want to take Duncanson’s conceptualisation of a (re)negotiation as a way in 
which to analyse the accounts of Ben and Mike to explore whether their views and 
experiences may represent a particular (re)negotiation of a more ‘gender conscious’ 
militarised masculinity. In the following sections I consider how Ben and Mike articulated 
issues of similarity, respect, interdependence, empathy and equality with others when 
discussing and making sense of their work, as well as the challenges and contradictions 
contained within these accounts.  
 
Respect 
 
Incredibly enthusiastic and convinced of the value of his work, Ben described his initial 
interest in gender issues at NATO as somewhat accidental; being asked to prepare a 
presentation on NATO’s implementation of UNSCR 1325 on relative short notice. Knowing 
little about the topic, Ben immersed himself in all the available material he could and in his 
words became a ‘believer’. Much like Ben, Mike’s described ‘falling into’ his role. Mike 
began by reviewing English language documents on gender issues that his colleague had 
developed as a favour. Reading the documents, Mike described ‘getting into the subject’ and 
being fascinated by what his colleague was trying to accomplish. Ben and Mike both 
articulated a strong sense of respect for their female colleagues (who form the majority of 
personnel working on gender issues), emphasising the difficult and challenging nature of 
their work. Mike noted that he saw his (female) colleague – whom he described as a ‘very 
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fine officer’ - taking on what he saw as ‘monumental challenge’ and wanted to help. In 
describing his interest in wider gender issues, Ben also noted that relations between men and 
women should be a ‘matter of respect’, that ‘we are different, but we have the same rights, 
equal rights’.  
 
Throughout his interview, Ben repeatedly drew upon the notion of ‘putting on gender glasses’ 
through which to view the world, and more specifically NATO operations. This is a common 
refrain in gender mainstreaming initiatives and gender training and education initiatives. The 
point being that by viewing the world or a specific situation through ‘gender sensitive’ lenses 
the differing security concerns of men and women are revealed, allowing for gender 
differences (and similarities) to be actively considered. For Ben, these gender glasses 
increased respect for others: 
 
‘In the armed forces as well as in civil society, it is not just a matter of having the 
same salaries, having the same access to work; it is having the same mentality. Once 
you get this mentality, especially in men, seeing life with your gender glasses, I think 
the lives of many people will change…you apply the gender glasses to everything and 
your level of respect for the other gender is much better’.   
 
In this account, it is specifically men that Ben draws attention too – a point returned to below 
– yet there is an acknowledgement of the relational nature of gender here. For Ben, a gender-
conscious approach to ‘everything’ has a positive overall effect of increasing respect for 
others.  
 
Empathy and Similarity 
 
When discussing his somewhat novel positon, Ben articulated a sense of empathy with his 
female colleagues. He was acutely aware that he was working in a field dominated by 
women:  
 
‘We try to find believers [in gender] and you find believers everywhere, they don’t 
need to be women, most of them are women. I can tell you, unfortunately, because I 
feel really alone in this world. I feel the same as when women joined the armed forces 
and they were just one or two and it is really hard, I can tell you, it is really hard. You 
have to behave because they are watching you…they are watching you, they are 
paying attention to what you do because you are, let’s say an alien in their world’.  
 
In finding himself in a minority position vis-à-vis women, he expresses a form of empathy 
with women in the military, acknowledging the difficulties in occupying such a position.  
Also, in acknowledging that the women who dominate work on gender issues are aware of 
him and are watching how he works and operates, he highlights something of a mutual 
wariness based upon his strong feelings of being out of place and highly visible. He 
conceives of himself as an alien in their world – one where it is implied he comes under 
scrutiny because of his difference. In this account, Ben is both similar to and distinctly 
different from women working on gender issues (a point returned to below). Mike did not 
articulate feeling as out of place as Ben did. He did however note a feeling of apprehension 
when doing his first presentation, mainly about being a man talking about gender, noting that 
he was in the minority and worrying that his audience might think: ‘how is a guy going to 
talk about that?’  
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In discussing the need for introducing gender issues into basic training across all NATO 
militaries, Ben highlighted the importance of moving beyond simply teaching an 
understanding of basic gender concepts to soldiers, towards fostering empathy for those 
within conflict zones: 
 
‘You have to introduce this issue, but in a serious way. You have to explain to them 
basic gender concepts, very basic gender concepts, but you have to go deeper. It is not 
just: ‘what is gender mainstreaming?’, ‘what are gender perspectives?’ It is more. It 
applies to people suffering the effects of wars and operations. You have to listen to 
them, understand how they feel, how the operations affect them and in which ways; 
ask how you can help them’. 
 
In reflecting on his work, Ben therefore articulated empathy with both his female colleagues 
and the need for gender perspectives within NATO to be based on empathy with civilians in 
conflict zones, of the need for listening and understanding3. For Ben, it was not just enough 
to ‘pass a course’; soldiers need to see life through ‘gender glasses’ to ‘see life in a different 
way’. So within both Ben and Mike’s accounts a feeling of discomfort is expressed in 
suddenly being both ‘visible’ and aware of gender in ways that they weren’t before. This 
discomfort can be productive if, like in Ben’s experience, it promotes empathy and 
understanding of others in similar positions.  
 
Interdependence  
 
There was also evidence of the importance of interdependence within Mike and Ben’s 
accounts, though in slightly different ways. For Mike, the concept of team work was 
extremely important. He viewed developing an effective ‘gender team’ – containing himself 
and his female colleague – as one of the most important aspects of his job. The effectiveness 
of the team was based, for Mike on the skills and perspectives each could bring:  
 
‘I’ve got a longer history in the military, I’ve been in the army almost as long as she 
has been alive, and I’ve got operations and training background so, there was a lot I 
could offer. Not just because I am a man, certainly a women who had been in the 
military as long as I have been and had the same roles as I have, would have been able 
to offer that’.  
 
What is interesting in this account is it is the skills that Mike has developed within his 
previous military experience, rather than his position/difference as a man, that he deems 
important; though this point is complicated by other accounts detailed below.  
 
In discussing training and development courses he attended, Ben recalled: ‘We have fifty 
percent women, fifty percent men; fifty percent military, fifty percent civilian; so the mixture 
is between men and women, military and civilians working together. It is chaos at the 
beginning but you learn a lot, both sides learn a lot. Working together with women you learn 
a lot’. Both men expressed a desire for an integrated, and interdependent, approach to 
promoting gender and the Women, Peace and Security agenda within NATO. Furthering his 
discussion of feeling ‘alone’ and an ‘alien’ outlined above, Ben went on to rationalise his 
inclusion, saying the success of gender work was dependent on the inclusion of both men and 
women: ‘women alone, they will never succeed, they need more men to get involved and 
spread the message’. He concluded that: ‘we need them, and they need us’.   
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Yet, what is also in evidence is the constant refrain throughout the interviews to the 
differences between men and women – them and us. In this sense then, Mike’s focus on 
acquired skills regardless of gender is something of an outlier. All those interviewed 
expressed notions of distinctly ‘male’ and ‘female’ ways of ‘viewing’ and ‘doing’ security 
(Hurley 2014, 128; 2016). Indeed, Mike himself made constant referral to his ‘male 
perspective’ on things – one that was different, though not necessarily more important, than 
the ‘female perspective’.  
 
However, there is a fine line between an interdependence built around empathy, respect and 
an understanding of difference, and a lapse into reductive understandings of 
complementarity. Repeatedly, civilian and military women are presented within NATO 
doctrine and promotional material regarding UNSCR 1325 and the Women, Peace and 
Security agenda, as having characteristics, skills and competencies that are complementary, 
holistic and distinct to that of men, ‘softer traits’ that include being more attuned to 
‘listening’ and ‘intelligence gathering’, for example: 
 
The experiences and skills of both men and women are essential to the success of 
NATO operations. Today’s conflicts often require a comprehensive approach in terms 
of more tactful public relations, better and more extensive situational awareness, 
information operations, information gathering and intelligence production. Women in 
NATO-led forces can be an asset and an enabler, especially in activities of 
engagement with the local population. (NATO 2012a, 11) 
 
Where this becomes problematic is if it assumed that men cannot or will not embody or 
practice these ‘feminine competencies’, that they are solely the preserve of women. This 
reinforces an overly simplistic binary and hierarchy between different desirable skills of war-
fighting men and peaceable women. It places limits on both the perceptions of what women 
(and men) within NATO militaries - and those civilians who find themselves within a NATO 
theatre of operation - are ‘allowed’ to do. As Dianne Otto (2006, 139) states: ‘If women are 
admitted on the understanding that their special contribution arises from their womanly 
instincts, it follows that their political agency will be limited to what is made possible by that 
representation and restricted to “feminised tasks”’. 
 
Ben and Mike’s micro-level experiences are formed, conditioned and practiced within this 
wider institutional context. This leads to a contestation between the complexity of gender 
relations at the individual level - in this case those based around an understanding of mutual 
interdependence, empathy and a respect of differences - and a reductive and essentialised 
understanding and representation of these relationships at the institutional level. Here then, 
analysing Ben and Mike’s experiences in context, demonstrates the importance of accounting 
for the pressures acting upon (re)negotiations of a more gender conscious masculinity 
specifically and NATO’s interpretation of the Women, Peace and Security agenda more 
broadly. It is to these pressures - and the challenges and contradictions they produce - I now 
turn.  
 
Challenges and Contradictions 
 
The accounts above show how there is, at some level, a (re)negotiation of a more gender 
conscious militarised masculinity; in part based upon notions of respect, interdependence and 
empathy with both female colleagues and civilians. Yet Ben and Mike also articulated what 
they perceived as challenges to gender work in NATO more broadly. In doing so, both 
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produced rationales for their work that – like the notion of complementarity - throw up some 
interesting contradictions and complicate this understanding of a more gender conscious 
masculinity emerging within NATO.  
 
Masculinist Protection  
 
In making sense of and communicating the importance of his work to others, Ben, in 
particular, framed his job role in narratives of masculinist protection (Young 2003). He began 
the interview by describing the need to constantly correct ‘misunderstandings’ of what his 
work entailed: 
 
‘I speak with my friends, and I say I work in gender and they start shouting about the 
gays and the lesbians and you have to say: “I don’t have anything to do with gays and 
lesbians, it is gender”. The thing is, what I do mainly is work to protect men and 
women, boys and girls who suffer the effects of operations, missions and worse; and 
in that moment people change their perspective and say: “oh my god”; and I say: “you 
can literally help them”’.  
 
The conflation issues of gender and homosexuality has been identified as a concern of men 
involved or interested in gender equality initiatives. In their study of gender mainstreaming 
within EU member states Ruxton and Van der Gaag (2013, 169) identify that there was 
‘absolute terror in individual men coming across as gay, as female and so on’. Here then, 
there is a fear of feminisation and subordination through association with homosexuality. Ben 
began the interview by talking about his family, particularly about his wife and children, 
something Mike also did, thereby affirming their heterosexuality and mitigating any 
misperceptions of their own sexuality. In his response, Ben positions himself as a protector of 
vulnerable women, children and of men, a theme which was recurrent throughout Ben’s 
interview: 
 
‘I tend to think that we work for men and women, boys and girls. You focus on the 
weakest part, the people that are suffering the most. So maybe men don’t suffer, but 
then I think that is happening more and more. In that way our objective is much more 
interesting and your work is much more rewarding let’s say’ 
 
Departing from feminist work that views masculinity as self-consciously dominative, Iris 
Marion Young explores the security state, post-9/11, through a logic of masculinist protection 
which draws on a more benign, chivalrous form of masculinity (2003, 3-4)4. This ‘gallant’ 
masculinity offers – predominately women and children - protection from an ‘other’ 
masculinity embodied by ‘bad’ men, who exploit, harm and abuse the vulnerable for the 
pleasures of domination; this protection forms part of an exchange. The protected woman 
defers to the protectors judgement, looks up to him with gratitude for his manliness and 
admiration for his willingness to face the dangers of the world (5). This gratitude in turn 
reinforces his perception of his own masculinity and worth and ‘in return for male protection, 
the woman concedes critical distance from decision-making autonomy’ (4). 
 
Here then, Ben builds upon the empathy he expressed in the accounts above. Listening to 
affected civilians (men, women, boys and girls), understanding how they feel, how the 
operations affect them in different ways and asking how you can help, for Ben, forms part of 
this new gender conscious militarised masculinity, it is also one framed by a desire to protect. 
In similar ways to Young’s (2003) conceptualisation, Ben’s account of masculinist protection 
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is expressed in benign terms. Interestingly, in Ben’s accounts there is no explicit reference to 
‘other masculinity’ or ‘bad men’; the protection work on gender issues can offer in Ben’s 
articulation is from the effects of NATO operations and missions on those that are vulnerable. 
There is no self-consciously dominative sense to the protection Ben is offering in his account, 
although a hierarchy between vulnerable, non-western civilians and a powerful western 
military organisation acting a protector is established nonetheless. Yet, according to Young: 
‘the role of the masculine protector puts those protected, paradigmatically women and 
children, in a subordinate position of dependence’ (2003, 2 - emphasis added). In this 
conceptualisation, civilian women, men and children in areas of conflict – whilst better 
protected - are still dependent on a (gender conscious) NATO.  
 
The Genderman: Trivialisation and Feminisation 
 
In discussing the challenges that he faced in his job role, Ben described how working on 
gender issues had been met with some resistance from some male colleagues: 
 
‘…but other people are not convinced, even my colleagues make a lot of jokes about 
me: “you are ‘genderman’, have you shaved your legs”? These are jokes, but 
sometimes, inside their brains, there is some kind of truth. They don’t believe in this. 
Now seeing a man [doing this work], I think they will open their eyes a little bit more’ 
 
In this account Ben’s colleagues seek to feminise him individually and by extension identify 
his work as feminine. They use humour to both link gender work at NATO with (a culturally 
specific) feminine practice – the shaving of legs – reinforcing an implicit and persistent 
conflation of gender with ‘women’s issues’, whilst simultaneously feminising Ben’s 
masculinity. Women shave their legs, men do not; therefore gender is a woman’s concern, 
not a man’s. In this example, through working on gender issues, by addressing and 
highlighting the merits of the Women, Peace and Security agenda to other men within the 
organisation, the construction of masculinity Ben is seen to embody is questioned. He is seen 
in the eyes of some of his colleagues to be deviating from an appropriately masculine job role 
within NATO’s gender order.  
 
In one sense then, this trivialisation/feminisation via humour that Ben experiences is an 
example of what Duncanson finds problematic with Connell’s (re)formulation of a positive 
hegemonic masculinity beginning with a version of masculinity that is open to equality with 
women as hegemonic among men (followed by an eradication of relations of hierarchy) 
(2015, 241). As Duncanson notes, one of the ways in which hegemonic masculinity achieves 
its hegemonic status is through the feminisation of other groups of men and that feminisation 
is such an effective strategy in terms of positioning and policing subordinate groups of men 
(Ibid). Jeff Hearn has argued that ‘trivialisation through humour’ is one of myriad social and 
psychological resources that military organisations provide for the reproduction and changing 
of individual psychologies (in Higate 2003a, xiii). This threat of feminisation begins at basic 
training where it is used to ‘downgrade and police groups of men…with the archetypal use of 
“woman”, “girl”, “queer”, “faggot” to put down those who are failing to complete the various 
physical challenges associated with manliness’ (Duncanson 2015, 235 citing Segal 1997; 
McManners 1993; Woodward 1998; Higate 2003a; Hockey 2003). For those who made the 
comments, Ben has deviated from their view of appropriately masculine work. Lazar (2005, 
2007) suggests that these sort of ‘gender crossings’ – the transgression of expected gender 
norms, in this case a military man working on gender issues - emphasises the underlying 
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dualism of the gender structure. Deviations from these gender-appropriate norms are often 
policed through criticism and containment (Lazar 2005, 8-9).  
 
And yet, within this account Ben sees himself as challenging these views and in that sense 
does not see himself as ‘contained’, neither I would suggest, did he view himself as 
particularly feminised; he views his position as an opportunity. Despite these challenges, he 
aims to use his uniqueness (as a man doing gender work at NATO) to challenge these views. 
Whilst he did not experience overt personal hostility in the same way as Ben, Mike also 
described the resistance he encountered. Recalling briefings to senior commanders, he noted 
a minority: ‘just don’t see the practical use. They just can’t get beyond the idea that women, 
approaching them, understanding them and that addressing their security needs matters at all’. 
But, like Ben, noted how he sought to challenge these views, particularly as a man speaking 
to other men: ‘I know some men here will tell me, and they wouldn’t tell her (his female 
colleague), that they don’t quite buy the concept. So, I can have conversations with them as 
far as that goes and both they and I gain a better insight into the concept’. So, both Ben and 
Mike are using their distinct positions, (re)negotiating their identities in the context within 
which they find themselves, to change the minds and perspectives of these resistant 
colleagues. Yet, what is highlighted here is the importance of men speaking to, listening to 
and being influenced by other men (rather than their female colleagues). This is a point that 
was reiterated throughout the interviews, most specifically in discussions regarding 
credibility.  
 
Male Credibility, ‘Operations’ and Problems with ‘Equality’ 
 
The desire for more men to become involved in gender work was a recurring theme in the 
interviews I conducted. The benefits of involving men on gender equality issues have been 
acknowledged in a broad range of policy areas (Hearn 2001; Connell 2003; 2005b; 
Kaufmann 2003). Yet, the inclusion of men, whilst seen as a ‘good thing to do’, was justified 
primarily as a way to counter the resistance that the women experienced when speaking about 
gender issues to male colleagues. The presence of men talking about and doing gender work 
offered what was described as credibility. Grace, one of the research participants noted: ‘what 
I’m looking for is a male champion to talk about this, because I’m not going to get 
anywhere’.  For Anna having a man on the team offered the dual benefits of providing a 
‘male perspective’ and also lending credibility to the process: 
 
‘Yeah, and concerning the male perspective I think it is very, very important to really 
establish a gender advisor office with a woman as well as a man. Because having a 
man in the team really adds to credibility and most of the people in the military are 
men and having a man working on that what is often perceived as simply women’s 
issues gives a great deal of credibility’.  
 
In these accounts, the ‘transgression’ of men doing gender work, rather than being actively 
policed or controlled by feminisation, is being actively encouraged. The rationale expressed 
for this credibility was that men could link gender work to ‘operations’ in a way that was 
accessible and interesting to other men within NATO. There was a desire, expressed by those 
interviewed, to distance their work from concepts of gender equality and women’s rights 
explicitly – what one female participant, Nora, described as ‘female stuff’, as this was seem 
as inherently uninteresting to both men and women within NATO - and to align it with pre-
existing alliance goals, where a gender perspective could increase operational effectiveness 
(Hurley 2014; forthcoming). Those interviewed described what they saw as a constant 
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‘misunderstanding’ or conflation of ‘gender’ with ‘women’ or simply ‘equal rights’. For 
example, for Nora it wasn’t simply that the concept of gender was conflated with women, it 
was that women ‘doing gender’ within NATO were associated with and signified particular 
‘things’ – particularly women’s rights and equal opportunities. One of Nora’s roles was to 
promote awareness about gender and UNSCR 1325 within the organisation. Here she 
describes having to develop a strategy to counter the conflation: 
 
‘Here [at NATO] we are also about gender awareness, why is it important for 
operations and not only female stuff, because female stuff they are not interested in. 
They [the military commanders] are interested in operational issues, so you make the 
link … I think it is important that we deliver something that is of interest to 
them…how to implement it [gender] in the operational planning process that is 
something that is sexy for them, the operational thing’  
 
Therefore, in one sense, Mike, and Ben are not being asked to talk explicitly about the 
‘female stuff’ of women’s rights and equality. In one respect, they can be used to represent 
‘male stuff’ and can symbolically link gender work to the more unproblematic area of 
‘operations’. Mike exemplified this distinction when asked what the challenges in his job role 
were, he replied:  
 
‘I think that the biggest challenge was just initially developing the message. I think 
it’s good here that we are really the only people that are in charge of this concept, 
because it can be overtaken by somebody who is interested in equal opportunity and 
women’s rights and these types of things, as a venue for pushing that agenda, and that 
is the biggest danger’. 
 
It is worth stressing that Mike is not suggesting that gender equality is unimportant, but he 
went to great lengths to stress what his work ‘did not do’ and that the gender work him and 
his colleague were developing should be seen as an ‘operational tool’. Again, like in Ben’s 
conceptualisation of the protection a more gender-conscious NATO can offer, this does not 
necessarily make women ‘unsafe’ and is not the ‘dominative masculinity’ identified by 
Young (2003); but by searching for male champions, by valorising male credibility, the 
position of women doing gender work at NATO is somewhat undermined. To return to 
Young’s logic, an exchange takes place; in return for the support and credibility of the ‘male 
perspective’ and the male body through which to communicate gender work, women concede 
a key role and begin to distance themselves in certain ways (2003, 4); narratives of 
‘operations’ and ‘operational effectiveness’ come to define the work rather than the more 
‘problematic’ notions of rights and equality.  
 
In some ways then, in doing gender work, in developing a more gender conscious 
masculinity, Ben and Mike embody a form of disruption and in their accounts above, they 
become note a discomfort in becoming visible and being out of place. For Mike, aligning his 
understanding of gender work specifically with operations rather than equal rights, he 
mitigates this discomfort. Michelle Lazar identifies ‘as individuals, people may deviate from 
the archetypes of masculinity and femininity pertinent to a community (the organisation that 
they work in for example) this nonetheless occurs against the ideological structure of gender 
that privileges men as a social group’ (2005, 7). As men they can draw down on what 
Connell identified as the ‘patriarchal dividend’ that gives them access to symbolic social and 
political capital (Connell 1995, 79-80; Lazar 2005, 7) present in the hegemonic space they 
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find themselves within, to disseminate information in a way that is deemed credible and 
legitimate to their intended audience in a way that is more problematic for women.  
 
Conclusion: A More Gender Conscious Militarised Masculinity?  
 
Increasingly, ‘global’ gender policies such as UNSCR 1325 and the Women, Peace and 
Security agenda are being actively integrated into international security organisations, such as 
NATO and national militaries. The work of integrating and promoting these, of ‘doing 
gender’, falls inevitably to particular individuals within these organisations. This article has 
shown how, though actively engaging in gender work, military masculinities – at the 
individual level – are being (re)negotiated in particular ways; that identities can be 
constructed not through relations of opposition and dominance but through mutual respect, 
empathy and interdependence. Yet, these are small changes, expressed in a complicated and 
contradictory way by two individuals in a large multinational security alliance. They do not 
represent a wider transformative shift in gender relations at NATO; this, more gender 
conscious masculinity, is embryonic, not hegemonic. Yet neither should these shifts be 
dismissed as insignificant. As Parpart and Partridge note, ‘many people practice masculinities 
within the military in a way that does not match the ideal of a dominant, militarised, hyper-
masculinity that occupies hegemonic space. These non-hegemonic masculinities do not need 
to be seen as subordinate or unsuccessful’ (2014, 568).  
 
Duncanson suggests two ways in which to challenge the way hegemonic masculinity is 
constructed: firstly, by exposing and making explicit the contradictions inherent in 
hegemonic masculinities that have adopted ‘softer traits’ in order to retain power (2015, 243). 
Whilst, I have suggested that a more gender conscious masculinity is not hegemonic at 
NATO, with the active and enthusiastic ways in which the alliance is adopting the Women, 
Peace and Security agenda, and emphasising the adoption of a more ‘holistic’ approach to 
operations, including a gender perspective, there is evidence of NATO embracing these 
‘softer traits’. The accounts above expose some of the contradictions that emerge from doing 
gender work at NATO, including the difficultly in speaking about and articulating ‘women’s 
rights’ and ‘equality’ specifically. The ways in which gender work is linked to operations, as 
a device to increase operational effectiveness and force multiplication is problematic. 
Likewise, the use of narratives of masculinist protection, as a way of rationalising and 
making sense of gender work, can be equally as problematic if they create dependence and 
subordination that stymies empowerment and reinforces a hierarchical relationship between 
protector and those protected (Young 2003; Messerschmitt 2015, 172). What is needed then 
is a constant vigilance in the ways these contradictions and contestations manifest, ‘for 
feminists to push at those contradictions, make them explicit, in the hope of forcing 
consideration of the underlying problems’ (Duncanson 2015, 243).  
 
The second stage for Duncanson, is to encourage relational thinking, for men to change their 
relationships, not simply their ways; shifting from constructing their identities in terms of 
radical othering to forging identities through relations of equality, respect and empathy (2015, 
243). The accounts of Ben and Mike offered some evidence of these (re)negotiations. As 
individuals begin to engage with gender work more fully at NATO, tracing and encouraging 
these (re)negotiations can be productive in fostering more progressive change: building on 
‘reflexive moments’ and empathy prompted by (however fleeting a) discomfort of becoming 
highly visible and out of place; communicating and reinforcing notions of respect and 
interdependence, whilst being wary of lapsing into reductive understandings of 
complementarity and essentialised difference. As Parpart and Partridge (2014, 563) note: ‘the 
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move towards healthier or more equitable gender relations may not come from a ‘better’ 
masculinity but from lessons learned from practices of masculinity when it is neither 
dominant nor hegemonic, within both the military and society as a whole’.  
 
As I noted in the introduction, this article is viewed as a starting point for wider research on 
the impact of asking military men to ‘do gender work’ in response to the Women, Peace and 
Security agenda at NATO. In that sense the accounts of Ben and Mike offer some lessons 
learned and avenues for further exploration. What is evident is that whilst changes within 
militarised masculinities are not always superficial, they are always subject to contestation. 
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1
 Six interviews (four women, two men) were conducted as part of my doctoral research into NATO’s 
engagement with UNSCR 1325 and the Women, Peace and Security agenda (Hurley 2014). 
Participants were recruited using a mixed method of limited snowballing and by direct contact with 
participants through publically available email addresses. Each semi-structured interview lasted 
between sixty to ninety minutes and was audio recorded. Three interviews were conducted at NATO 
HQ which is based in Brussels, Belgium and one at a mutually convenient location with the United 
Kingdom. Two interviews were conducted via Skype due to the impracticability of visiting the 
country and region in which two participants were on active deployment. 
 
2 I understand this has an impact on the analysis generated – particularly in regards to contextually 
specific and nuanced constructions of hegemonic masculinities – however, offering anonymity 
allowed participants to speak freely about their experiences. Whilst military elites can be seen as less 
‘vulnerable’ than other marginalised or disadvantaged groups, protecting participants anonymity is 
still an important consideration when researching elite groups. However, even with these omissions, 
due to the small number of men working in this area, complete anonymity cannot be guaranteed. Each 
participant was therefore made aware of this condition and asked to sign a consent form, as well as 
being informed verbally at the beginning of each interview. 
3
 The problematic way in which this listening and understanding is used by NATO to further 
operational effectiveness and force multiplication falls outside of the scope of this paper. See Hurley 
(forthcoming) for a discussion of these issues.  
 
4 Young (2003) identifies how the logic of masculinist protection was used to legitimise and authorise 
the United States’ actions in Afghanistan and Iraq whilst also authorising increased surveillance 
domestically. Narratives of masculinist protection can be seen to be embedded within the engagement 
with UNSCR 1325 and the Women, Peace and Security agenda (Hurley 2014). At the more abstract 
level, NATO can be seen as a collectivisation of the security state, protecting its citizens from an 
‘other’ and external threat, beyond the (real and imagined) borders of the alliance. The citizen, in this 
22 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
reading, as ‘protected’, defers decision making autonomy to the nation state as protector and by 
extension the NATO alliance. This gendered logic helps NATO to define and locate itself and to align 
its engagement with UNSCR 1325 and the Women, Peace and Security agenda with wider 
organisational ‘values’ (Hurley 2014).  
 
